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Abstract We extend an analytically solvable core-periphery model by introduc-
ing a monopolistically competitive sector of non-tradable goods that is mobile across
regions. We find that when the elasticity of substitution among non-tradable goods is
very low, there is agglomeration of all the production (of both tradable and non-tradable
goods). When the elasticity of substitution among non-tradable goods is sufficiently
high (“no black-hole” condition), then there is symmetric dispersion of all the produc-
tion, if trade costs are high; or full agglomeration of the production of tradable goods
with partial agglomeration of the production of non-tradable goods, if trade costs are
low.
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1 Introduction
The literature on new economic geography has grown extensively over the last two
decades, following the work of Krugman (1991), which illustrates how a country can
endogenously become differentiated into an industrialized core and an agricultural
periphery.1 In his model, trade costs are crucial to explain the spatial distribution of
economic activity. If trade costs are high, industrial activity tends to be dispersed
across regions, while if trade costs are low, the industrial activity tends to agglomerate
in a single region.
Despite it being a stylized fact that services (which are mainly non-tradable) have
a very significant weight in the developed economies, representing around 75% of
the total employment in the EU27, the standard literature in new economic geogra-
phy typically assumes that regions only have a perfectly competitive “agricultural”
sector (which produces perfectly tradable goods2) and a monopolistically competitive
“industrial” sector (which produces partially tradable goods). See for example, the
works of Puga (1999), Fujita et al. (2001), Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), and Baldwin
et al. (2003).
A notable exception is the work of Helpman (1998), who replaced the agricultural
sector by a perfectly competitive non-tradable goods sector (housing). Assuming that
the location of this sector is fixed, Helpman showed that housing acts as a dispersion
force, by increasing the cost of living in a more populated region.
Similar results were obtained by Südekum (2006) and by Pflüger and Südekum
(2008), who have also considered a perfectly competitive and immobile non-tradable
goods sector, but now in addition to the traditional agricultural and industrial sectors.
They showed that, starting from a situation of dispersion of industrial activity, falling
trade costs lead to agglomeration. However, when trade costs become sufficiently low,
the relative importance of housing prices dominates the agglomeration forces and dis-
persion occurs again. Contrasting with most new economic geography models, which
feature “bang-bang” phenomena (either symmetric dispersion or full agglomeration of
the industrial activity), the model of Pflüger and Südekum (2008) can generate partial
agglomeration.
Recently, Cerina and Mureddu (2009) have extended the new economic geography
and growth model of Baldwin et al. (2001) by incorporating an immobile and perfectly
competitive non-tradable goods sector that benefits from local knowledge spillovers
from the manufacturing sector. Their main result is that, with the existence of such a
sector, agglomeration may be detrimental for growth.
Non-tradable goods also appear in the model of Behrens (2004). But, in this case, the
absence of interregional trade is an endogenous outcome. Firms sell to those locations
that allow them to make a positive profit, thus, depending on the level of trade costs
and on the degree of competition, each good may be effectively traded (to another
region) or not. Behrens (2004) showed that when the trade costs are higher than a
1 Space and geography had been considered in general equilibrium models long before that. See for exam-
ple, Von Thünen (1826) and Takayama and Judge (1971).
2 Davis (1998) studied the importance of the assumption that “agricultural” goods are perfectly tradable
and found that introducing a trade cost for “agricultural” goods makes the “home-market” effect disappear.
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threshold value, all the industrial goods are non-tradable. In such an environment, the
economy comprises only an agricultural sector and a non-tradable goods sector. For
this particular case, Behrens (2004) also showed that full and partial agglomeration in
the non-tradable sector arises in a completely autarchic world, and that the structure
of the spatial economy is determined by the ratio between the supply of the mobile
factor and the supply of the immobile factor.
To the best of our knowledge, the only model that considers a mobile sector of non-
tradable goods is that of Tabuchi and Thisse (2006).3 They assume that all workers
are mobile (across the two regions and the two sectors) and introduce a housing cost
that increases with local population to generate a dispersion force. In contrast with
the results that we provide here, they found that the non-tradable goods sector should
become more agglomerated than the tradable goods sector.
We also seek to explain the spatial distribution of both tradable and non-
tradable goods, but in a different framework. We generalize the analytically solv-
able core-periphery model of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) by incorporating a sector
of non-tradable goods that is monopolistically competitive and mobile across regions,
like the manufacturing sector. We will designate it as the “service sector,” in spite of
the fact that there are services that are tradable (for example, those that are internet-
based). We refer, therefore, to non-tradable services such as education, health care,
arts and entertainment, restaurants, housing, construction, urban transportation, retail,
and administrative support.
With the workers that operate in the service sector (like those in the industrial sec-
tor) being able to move to the region with the highest utility level, we find that the
resulting spatial configuration may be of full agglomeration, symmetric dispersion, or
a combination of full agglomeration of industry with partial agglomeration of services.
A strong preference for variety in the service sector is a very strong agglomeration
force. For any value of the manufacturing trade costs, full agglomeration of industry
and services in one region is an equilibrium whenever the elasticity of substitution
among services is lower than a threshold value (“black-hole” condition).
If the preference for variety of services is relatively weak (“no black-hole” con-
dition), the manufacturing trade costs again become crucial to explain the location
of economic activity. If these are high, industry and services become symmet-
rically dispersed across regions. If manufacturing trade costs are low, then the
industry becomes agglomerated in one region, while services become partially agglom-
erated in the same region (core). Availability of more varieties of services in the core
than in the periphery is an additional agglomeration force that prevents the industrial
workers from moving to the periphery. Reciprocally, the proximity to manufacturing
goods attracts the service sector workers, “distorting” the service sector toward the
core.
3 In the previously mentioned works by Südekum (2006) and by Pflüger and Südekum (2008), the location
of the non-tradable goods sector has been assumed to be fixed. This is a crucial difference, as the people in
one region must then share the “cake” of services among themselves (in this case, services clearly act as a
dispersion force). With service sector workers being mobile across regions, the distribution of this “cake”
over across regions becomes endogenous.
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Our results contrast with those obtained for the case of an immobile supply of
non-tradable goods (Helpman 1998; Südekum 2006; Pflüger and Südekum 2008),
where these clearly acted as a dispersion force. To understand why, observe that an
increase in the industrial activity in a region increases the demand for non-tradable
goods in this region. If the supply is fixed, then the equilibrium is re-established through
an increase in the price of non-tradable goods. This increases the cost of living of the
industrial workers, thus acting as a dispersion force. If one considers that the supply
of non-tradable goods is mobile, then an increase in the industrial activity in a region
increases the demand for non-tradable goods, but also increases the supply (because
the workers in the service sector are attracted by the greater availability of industrial
goods at lower prices). Then, the non-tradable sector may either act as a dispersion
force or as an agglomeration force.
In the standard literature, it is shown that when trade costs are low, the indus-
try tends to agglomerate in a single region (core). The “cost-of-living” effect
and the “home-market” effect dominate the “market-crowding” effect (the oppo-
site occurs when trade costs are high). With a fixed supply of non-tradable
goods, this is no longer true, because non-tradable goods become so expensive in
the core and so cheap in the periphery that the industrial activity tends to dis-
perse. Now, with the supply of non-tradable goods being mobile, the increase
in the supply of non-tradable goods in the core compensates the increase in the
demand. Therefore, the industry may still agglomerate fully (if the “cost-of-living”
effect and the “home-market” effect dominate), while the service sector agglom-
erates only partially (because of the extreme strength of the “market-crowding”
effect).4
To better understand what drives our results, it is useful to distinguish between
localization economies, which induce an attraction between firms that operate in the
same sector and urbanization economies, which induce an attraction between firms
in general. Observe that the agglomeration forces that are at work in the core-periph-
ery model, the “cost-of-living” effect, and the “home-market” effect are urbanization
economies. On the other hand, the “market-crowding” effect only generates locali-
zation diseconomies, because there is no competition between firms that operate in
different sectors—neither in the product markets nor in the labor markets. The partial
agglomeration of the service sector in the core is such that the urbanization economies
that result from locating in the region where all the industry is located is exactly com-
pensated by the localization diseconomies that result from locating in a region with
more competitors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Sect. 2,
together with the concepts of short-run and long-run equilibrium. In Sect. 3, the dif-
ferent possible long-run equilibria are described and the economic conditions that
generate each kind of equilibrium are studied. The case in which services are partially
tradable is briefly illustrated. In Sect. 4, some concluding remarks are made. All the
technical proofs are presented in an “Appendix.”
4 An empirical study of the “home-market” effect may be found in Davis and Weinstein (2003).
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2 The model
2.1 Basic setup
The model is an extension of the analytically solvable core-periphery model of
Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) that incorporates a third sector of non-tradable goods
(“services”).5
The economy comprises two regions and three sectors: an “agricultural” sector (per-
fectly tradable goods), an “industrial” sector (partially tradable goods), and a “service”
sector (non-tradable goods). There are three factors of production: immobile workers
(A), industrial sector workers (M), and service sector workers (S).
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and produces a homogeneous good
under constant returns to scale using only immobile labor. The industrial sector and
the service sector produce a horizontally differentiated product using sector-specific
labor (fixed cost) and immobile labor (variable cost).
The transportation of agricultural output across regions is assumed to be costless,
but the transportation of industrial goods and services is subject to iceberg transporta-
tion costs. For each unit of the industrial good that is shipped to the other region, only
a fraction τm ∈ (0, 1) arrives. The trade of services across regions is more costly: only
a fraction τs ∈ [0, τm] arrives.6 We will give particular attention to the case in which
services are non-tradable across regions (τs → 0).
In the long run, the industrial and service sector workers are mobile across regions
(they migrate to the region where they attain a higher utility), contrarily to the immobile
workers. In the short run, all workers are immobile.
We will denote by M1 and M2, with M1 + M2 = M , the number of industrial work-
ers in regions 1 and 2, respectively, and by S1 and S2, with S1 + S2 = S, the number
of service sector workers in regions 1 and 2, respectively. The number of immobile
workers is the same in both regions, A1 = A2 = A/2, and the total population is
normalized to unity, A + M + S = 1.
The nominal income in region i , denoted by Yi , is the sum of the incomes of the
immobile, industrial, and service sector workers. With their nominal wages denoted
by Wai , Wmi and Wsi , respectively, we have
Yi = Wai 1 − M − S2 + Wmi Mi + Wsi Si , for i ∈ {1, 2} . (1)
2.2 Demand
2.2.1 Preferences
All the workers have the same preferences for the consumption of industrial goods
(Cm), services (Cs), and agricultural goods (Ca). A natural extension of the utility
5 It will be straightforward to verify that by considering that the size of the “service” sector is null (μs = 0),
we obtain the model of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
6 In Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) the model is set up, so that the parameter describing transportation costs
is in (1,+∞) instead.
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function used by Krugman (1991) and by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) to an economy
with three sectors is the following:7
U = Cμmm Cμss C1−μm−μsa , (2)
Cm =
(
nm∑
k=1
c
σm−1
σm
mk
) σm
σm−1
, (3)
Cs =
(
ns∑
k=1
c
σs−1
σs
sk
) σs
σs−1
, (4)
where μm ∈ (0, 1) and μs ∈ (0, 1), with μm + μs < 1, are the shares of spending
on industrial goods and on services; nm and ns are the number of existing varieties of
industrial goods and of services; cmk and csl are the consumption of the industrial good
produced by firm k and of the service provided by the firm l; and, finally, σm > 1 and
σs > 1 are the elasticities of substitution among industrial goods and among services.
2.2.2 Agricultural sector
The price of the agricultural good is the same in both regions, as its transportation is
assumed to be costless,8 and chosen to be the numeraire (Pa = 1).
The demand for agricultural goods in region i , which we denote by Cai , results
from utility maximization (2) with respect to Ca . Agents optimize by spending a share
of their income in agricultural goods that is equal to 1 − μm − μs . Therefore,
Cai = P−1a (1 − μm − μs) Yi = (1 − μm − μs) Yi .
2.2.3 Industrial sector
The demand in region i for the industrial variety k, which we denote by cmki , is obtained
from utility maximization (3) with respect to cmk . It can be shown that (Baldwin et al.
2003, pp. 38–39):
c
mk
i = (pmki )−σm
μmYi∑nm
k=1(p
mk
i )
1−σm ,
where pmki is the price charged per unit of the industrial variety k delivered in region
i and Yi is the regional income.
7 The same specification was chosen by Cerina and Mureddu (2009). An alternative could be the formula-
tion considered by Tabuchi and Thisse (2006), in which the contributions of each sector are additive instead
of multiplicative.
8 Davis (1998) shows that the basic properties of new economic geography models change when this
technically convenient assumption is dispensed with.
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The industrial price index in region i can be defined as:
Pmi =
[
nm∑
k=1
(pmki )
1−σm
] 1
1−σm
(5)
Using (5), the demand in region i for the industrial variety k becomes
c
mk
i =
(pmki )
−σm
P1−σmmi
μmYi . (6)
Since there is a large number of firms in the industrial sector, the price elasticity of
demand is approximately equal to σm (we have equality if there is a continuum of
firms).9
2.2.4 Service sector
All the expressions obtained in the previous subsection apply. The only difference is
that, later, the trade costs will be assumed to tend to infinity (τs → 0).10
The demand in region i for the service variety k is given by:
c
sk
i =
(pski )
−σs
P1−σssi
μsYi , (7)
where pski is the price charged per unit of service k delivered in region i and the
regional price index of services is Psi =
[∑ns
k=1(p
sk
i )
1−σs
] 1
1−σs
.
Again, we conclude that the price elasticity of demand is approximately equal to σs .
2.3 Supply
2.3.1 Agricultural sector
In the agricultural sector, firms use immobile labor to produce a homogeneous good
under constant returns to scale. The production function is qai = Lai , where qai is the
amount of agricultural goods produced in region i and Lai is the quantity of labor
employed. The cost function is CT ai = Wai qai and the profit function is:
ai = (Pa − Wai ) qai .
9 In the case of Cournot competition: 1m = 1σm + s(1 − 1σm ), where s is the market share of each firm.
With many firms in the economy (s ≈ 0), the price elasticity of demand, m , is approximately equal to the
elasticity of substitution, σm .
10 We do not consider directly the limit case because, with τs = 0, the demand of the agricultural work-
ers is indeterminate when services are concentrated in the other region. When restricted to Cs = 0, the
agricultural workers are indifferent between any attainable consumption vector.
123
78 V. Leite et al.
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive; therefore, Wai = Pa = 1.
2.3.2 Industrial sector
The firms in the industrial sector support a fixed cost of αm units of industrial labor,
and a variable cost of β units of immobile labor per unit of good produced.11 Using
the fact that Wai = 1, the cost function of the firm that produces variety k in region i
is CT mki = αm Wmi + β(qmkii + qmki j /τm), where qmkii is the quantity sold by the firm
in the region where it is located and qmki j is the quantity delivered to the other region.
With pmki j denoting the price at which the firm sells in each of the regions j ∈ {1, 2},
the profit function is:

mk
i =
[
pmkii (q
mk
ii ) − β
]
qmkii +
[
pmki j (q
mk
i j ) − β/τm
]
qmki j − αm Wmi . (8)
The firm chooses the quantities qmkii and q
mk
i j with the objective of maximizing
profits. Since the price elasticity of demand is a constant, σm , we have
pmkii =
σm
σm − 1β and p
mk
i j =
σm
σm − 1
β
τm
= p
mk
ii
τm
. (9)
Given the assumption of free entry, the profit of each firm must be zero. Substituting
(9) in (8), we obtain the following:
qmkii +
qmki j
τm
= αm
β
(σm − 1)Wmi . (10)
Since an industrial firm employs αm units of industrial labor, the number of indus-
trial firms in region i must be
nmi = Mi
αm
. (11)
2.3.3 Service sector
Firms in the service sector use αs units of service sector workers as a fixed cost and β
units of immobile workers per unit of output.
As in the industrial sector, the prices charged by the service sector firm located in
region i that produces the variety k are as follows:
pskii =
σs
σs − 1β and p
sk
i j =
σs
σs − 1
β
τs
= p
sk
ii
τs
.
11 It will become clear that setting αm , αs (below) and β to unity does not affect the spatial equilibrium out-
comes. These productivity parameters are irrelevant (according to this model) to explain the agglomeration
or dispersion of economic activity.
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The quantity produced by each firm is:
qskii +
qski j
τs
= αs
β
(σs − 1)Wsi . (12)
And, the number of firms in region i is:
nsi = Si
αs
. (13)
2.4 Short-run equilibrium concept
In a short-run equilibrium, there is equality between supply and demand in all the
labor markets and in all the goods markets, given the spatial distribution of industrial
and service sector workers.
We have already used the equality between supply and demand in the three labor
markets to find that Wai = 1, nmi = Miαm and nsi = Siαs .
Below, we consider the equilibrium conditions in the markets for goods and
services.
2.4.1 Industrial sector
Since all the industrial firms set the same prices, the industrial price index in region
i is:
Pmi =
[
nmi (pmii )
1−σm + nmj (pmji )1−σm
] 1
1−σm = βσm
σm − 1
(
nmi + nmjτσm−1m
) 1
1−σm
.
(14)
Defining φm = τσm−1m as the degree of economic integration for the industrial sector
(Baldwin et al. 2003), we obtain:12
Pmi = α
1
σm−1
m β
σm
σm − 1
(
Mi + M jφm
) 1
1−σm . (15)
With the demand for an industrial product that is produced in region i and consumed
in region j being denoted by cmi j , we have
cmii =
(
βσm
σm−1
)−σm
P1−σmmi
μmYi and cmi j =
τ
σm
m
(
βσm
σm−1
)−σm
P1−σmmj
μmY j . (16)
12 Since τm ∈ (0, 1), we have φm ∈ (0, 1) as well.
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In equilibrium we must have
qmii + τ−1m qmi j = cmii + τ−1m cmi j . (17)
Substituting (10), (15), and (16) in (17), we obtain the nominal wage of the industrial
workers in region i :
Wmi = μm
σm
(
Yi
Mi + φm M j +
φmY j
φm Mi + M j
)
. (18)
2.4.2 Service sector
Again, all the expressions obtained in the previous subsection apply.
The price index of services in region i ∈ {1, 2} is:
Psi = α
1
σs−1
s β
σs
σs − 1
(
Si + S jφs
) 1
1−σs , (19)
where φs = τσs−1s is the degree of economic integration in the service sector.
The internal and external demand for a service produced in region i are given by:
csii =
(
βσs
σs−1
)−σs
P1−σssi
μsYi and csi j =
τ
σs
s
(
βσs
σs−1
)−σs
P1−σss j
μsY j . (20)
And, the nominal wage of the service sector workers in region i ∈ {1, 2} is:
Wsi = μs
σs
(
Yi
Si + φs S j +
φsY j
φs Si + S j
)
. (21)
2.4.3 Perfect price index
The perfect price index of region i, Pi , aggregates three price indices: the price index
of the agricultural sector (normalized to 1), the price index of the industrial sector,
Pmi , and the price index of the service sector, Psi .
A worker in region i spends his nominal wage W to consume agricultural
goods, industrial goods, and services by choosing Cai = (1 − μm − μs) P−1ai W,
Cmi = μm P−1mi W , and Csi = μs P−1si W . Therefore, the utility that he attains is:
U = W
(1 − μm − μs)1−μm−μs μμmm μμss P−μmmi P−μssi
.
Therefore, the perfect price index in region i is:
Pi = (1 − μm − μs)1−μm−μs μμmm μμss P−μmmi P−μssi .
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Denoting the share of industrial workers in region 1 by fm = M1M , we obtain:
Pm1 = βσm
σm − 1
(
M
αm
) 1
1−σm [ fm + (1 − fm)φm]
1
1−σm ,
and
Pm2 = βσm
σm − 1
(
M
αm
) 1
1−σm [φm fm + (1 − fm)]
1
1−σm .
Similarly, defining fs = S1S as the share of service sector workers in region 1,
we obtain:
Ps1 = βσs
σs − 1
(
S
αs
) 1
1−σs [ fs + (1 − fs)φs]
1
1−σs ,
and
Ps2 = βσs
σs − 1
(
S
αs
) 1
1−σs [φs fs + (1 − fs)]
1
1−σs .
Using these expressions, we obtain the perfect price indices for each region:
P1 = ρ [ fm + (1 − fm)φm]
μm
1−σm [ fs + (1 − fs)φs]
μs
1−σs , (22)
and
P2 = ρ [φm fm + (1 − fm)]
μm
1−σm [φs fs + (1 − fs)]
μs
1−σs , (23)
where ρ = 1
(1−μm−μs )1−μm−μs μμmm μμss
(
βσm
σm−1
)μm ( βσs
σs−1
)μs ( M
αm
) μm
1−σm
(
S
αs
) μs
1−σs
.
2.4.4 Short-run equilibrium conditions
Recall that, in the short run, workers are immobile across regions and that a short-run
equilibrium consists in the equality of supply and demand in the labor markets and
in the markets for goods and services. Prices, output, and wages are endogenously
determined.
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Equations (1), (18), (21), (22), and (23) determine the short-run equilibrium of the
model. We rewrite these equations:
Y1 = 1 − M − S2 + Wm1 fm M + Ws1 fs S,
Y2 = 1 − M − S2 + Wm2(1 − fm)M + Ws2(1 − fs)S,
Wm1 = μm
σm M
[
Y1
fm + φm(1 − fm) +
φmY2
φm fm + 1 − fm
]
,
Wm2 = μm
σm M
[
Y2
1 − fm + φm fm +
φmY1
φm(1 − fm) + fm
]
,
Ws1 = μs
σs S
[
Y1
fs + φs(1 − fs) +
φsY2
φs fs + 1 − fs
]
,
Ws2 = μs
σs S
[
Y2
1 − fs + φs fs +
φsY1
φs(1 − fs) + fs
]
,
P1 = ρ [ fm + (1 − fm)φm]
μm
1−σm [ fs + (1 − fs)φs]
μs
1−σs ,
P2 = ρ [φm fm + (1 − fm)]
μm
1−σm [φs fs + (1 − fs)]
μs
1−σs .
Solving these equations, we find the nominal wages of the workers in each region.
The corresponding real wages (and utilities) are obtained simply by dividing the nom-
inal wages by the regional price indices:
ωm1 = Wm1P1 , ωm2 =
Wm2
P2
, ωs1 = Ws1P1 and ωs2 =
Ws2
P2
.
After obtaining general expressions for the regional wages in each sector, we let
φs → 0 to study the case in which services are non-tradable.13
2.5 Long-run equilibrium concept
In the long run, the industrial and service sector workers choose their location with
the objective of maximizing their utility (equivalently, they choose the region with the
highest real wage).
The values of fm and fs are no longer exogenous. For concreteness, it may be
assumed that the migration is driven by the following processes:
f˙m = d fmdt =
⎧⎨
⎩
ωm1( fs, fm) − ωm2( fs, fm), if 0 < fm < 1
min {0, ωm1( fs, fm) − ωm2( fs, fm)} , if fm = 1
max {0, ωm1( fs, fm) − ωm2( fs, fm)} , if fm = 0
13 See the Appendix for detailed calculations.
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and
f˙s = d fsdt =
⎧⎨
⎩
ωs1( fs, fm) − ωs2( fs, fm), if 0 < fs < 1
min {0, ωs1( fs, fm) − ωs2( fs, fm)} , if fs = 1
max {0, ωs1( fs, fm) − ωs2( fs, fm)} , if fs = 0.
A distribution of economic activity, ( f ∗s , f ∗m), is a steady state if and only if
f˙m = f˙s = 0 at ( f ∗s , f ∗m). A long-run equilibrium is a stable steady state.
The following are sufficient conditions for stability:
(i) if f ∗x = 0, then ωx1( f ∗x , f ∗y ) < ωx2( f ∗x , f ∗y ), for (x, y) ∈ {(s, m), (m, s)};
(ii) if f ∗x = 1, then ωx1( f ∗x , f ∗y ) > ωx2( f ∗x , f ∗y ), for (x, y) ∈ {(s, m), (m, s)};
(iii) if f ∗x ∈ (0, 1) ∧ f ∗y ∈ {0, 1}, then ∂(ωx1−ωx2)∂ fx |( f ∗x , f ∗y ) < 0, for (x, y) ∈{(s, m), (m, s)};
(iv) if f ∗m ∈ (0, 1) ∧ f ∗s ∈ (0, 1), then det (J )|( f ∗m , f ∗s ) > 0 and tr(J )|( f ∗m , f ∗s ) < 0,
where:
J =
[
∂(ωm1−ωm2)
∂ fm
∂(ωm1−ωm2)
∂ fs
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂ fm
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂ fs
]
.
Therefore, all these derivatives are well defined. The differences ωm1 − ωm2 and
ωs1 − ωs2 are continuous and differentiable functions of fm and fs , for ( fs, fm) ∈
(0, 1) × (0, 1).14
3 Long-run equilibrium
Focusing on the case in which services are non-tradable, we show that the following
are possible long-run equilibrium configurations (see Fig. 1):
(i) full agglomeration of industry and services in the same region;
(ii) full agglomeration of industry and partial agglomeration of services in the same
region;
(iii) symmetric dispersion of industry and services.
In what follows we shall describe the long-run equilibrium configurations and also
the combination of parameters that favors each of them. While the study of transitions
between two different configurations is a pertinent question, it requires the study of
the bifurcations, or break points, in a model with two state variables, fm and fs . This
requires a more sophisticated analysis of the Jacobian matrix at each configuration and
would go beyond the scope of this paper. We plan to address this issue in the future.
14 Inspection of the expressions for ωm1 − ωm2 and ωs1 − ωs2 shows that continuity of these differences
and their derivatives depends on the denominator in (41) not being zero. This is the case because K1 and
K2 are positive.
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Fig. 1 Possible equilibrium configurations: full agglomeration, symmetric dispersion, and full agglomer-
ation of industry with partial agglomeration of services
3.1 Agglomeration of industry and services in the same region
Agglomeration of the industrial and service activity in region 1 is an equilibrium if,
with ( f ∗s , f ∗m) = (1, 1), the real wages are higher in this region (ωm1 > ωm2 and
ωs1 > ωs2).
We find that full agglomeration only occurs if a “no black-hole” condition is violated
(see the proof in Appendix).
Lemma 1 Agglomeration of both sectors in a single region is an equilibrium if and
only if μs ≥ σs − 1.
In the model of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), which we extend, agglomeration
always prevails unless μm < σm − 1 (the “no black-hole” condition). We have found
that, with the incorporation of a non-tradable goods sector, the “no black-hole” con-
dition becomes μs < σs − 1. The only difference is that the relevant parameters are
those of the non-tradable goods sector. The former condition, μm < σm − 1, is no
longer necessary to avoid agglomeration.
This result also shows that trade costs in the industrial sector are irrelevant to explain
a simultaneous agglomeration of industry and services in a single region. Indepen-
dently of the trade costs in the industrial sector, a high (low) preference for variety of
services induces (avoids) full agglomeration of industry and services.
Why does a high preference for variety of services promote agglomeration? Recall
that agglomeration occurs if the “home-market” effect and the “cost-of-living” effect
dominate the “market-crowding” effect. Observe that the ratio between the nominal
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Fig. 2 Agglomeration of industry
wages, Ws1Ws2 , is inversely proportional to
fs
1− fs , independently of the value of σs (to find
this, substitute (1) in (21), set φs = 0 and solve for each Wsi ). This is obviously a
dispersion force, reflecting the dominance of the “market-crowding” effect over the
“home-market” effect. On the other hand, the price ratio, P1P2 , is inversely proportional
to
( fs
1− fs
) μs
σs−1
. It is an agglomeration force that more than compensates the dispersion
force if and only if μs
σs−1 > 1. The global effect is clear by the inspection of expres-
sion (42), according to which the real wage in the service sector is proportional to
f
μs
σs−1 −1
s . If there is agglomeration of services, agglomeration of industry follows as a
consequence (because U = 0 in a region without services).
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the existence of full agglomeration of the industrial and
service activity in one region when μs ≥ σs − 1.15
In Fig. 2, we assume that all the services are concentrated in region 1, fs = 1, and
we study the relationship between the spatial distribution of industry and the difference
between the real wages of the industrial workers across regions. We find that the real
wage is always higher in region 1. Thus, all industrial workers migrate to region 1.
In Fig. 3, we assume that all the industry is concentrated in region 1, fm = 1, and
we study how the spatial distribution of services affects the difference between the
real wages of the service sector workers across regions. We find that if the service
sector activity in region 1 is high enough, the service sector workers obtain a higher
15 To plot these figures, we have set τm = 0.5, μm = 0.4, σm = 4, μs = 0.4 and σs = 1.3.
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Fig. 3 Agglomeration of services
real wage in region 1. We conclude that full agglomeration of industry and services is
an equilibrium.
From now on, we will assume that μs < σs − 1 (“no black-hole” condition).
3.2 Full agglomeration of industry and partial agglomeration of services
Under the “no black-hole” condition, a migration of service workers to a region
decreases the attractiveness of this region to the service workers. This effect becomes
infinitely strong as the services approach full agglomeration.
Lemma 2 When μs < σs − 1, an increase in the share of services in region 1 ( fs)
decreases the difference between the real wages in the service sector (ωs1 − ωs2).
As the share of services increases from 0 to 1, the difference between the real wages
decreases from +∞ to −∞.
Therefore, the service sector can never be fully agglomerated in equilibrium. The
dispersion forces would be infinitely strong. What is possible is the full agglomeration
of industry together with partial agglomeration of services.
Full agglomeration of industrial activity in region 1 with partial agglomeration of the
service activity in the same region is an equilibrium if, with ( f ∗s , f ∗m) = (s, 1), where
s ∈ ( 12 , 1): the real wages in the industrial sector are higher in region 1 (ωm1 > ωm2);
the real wages in the service sector are equal across regions (ωs1 = ωs2); and a small
migration of service sector workers to region 1 makes region 2 become more attractive
than region 1 to these workers, inducing their return
(
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂ fs < 0
)
.
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Fig. 4 Agglomeration of industry
The following lemma describes the conditions for the existence of such an
equilibrium.
Lemma 3 Full agglomeration of industrial activity in region 1 or 2 and partial
agglomeration of the service activity in the same region is an equilibrium if μs < σs−1
and[
σm
(
1−μs
σs
)
−μm
σm
(
1−μs
σs
)
+μm
] μs
μs+1−σs
φ
1− μm (σs−1)
(σm−1)(σs−1−μs )
m −
φ2m
[
σs
(
1+μm
σm
)
−μs
]
+σs
(
1−μm
σm
)
−μs
2(σs−μs ) > 0.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate an equilibrium with full agglomeration of industry and
partial agglomeration of services.16 With fs = 0.586, we can see from Fig. 4 that
the real wage of the industrial workers is always higher in region 1. Thus, indus-
trial workers locate in region 1. In Fig. 5, we assume that all the industrial activ-
ity is concentrated in region 1, fm = 1, and study how the spatial distribution
of the service sector activity affects the difference between the real wages of the
service sector workers across regions. The migration of the service sector work-
ers leads to an equilibrium with fs = 0.586, as the real wages of the service
sector workers coincide. We conclude that the full agglomeration of industry in
region 1 and the partial agglomeration of services (58.6% in region 1) constitutes
an equilibrium.
16 To plot these figures, we have set τm = 0.825, μm = 0.4, σm = 4, μs = 0.4 and σs = 4. We have
also set fs = 0.586 in Fig. 4 and fm = 1 in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5 Partial agglomeration of services
One of the central messages of the new economic geography literature is that there
is full agglomeration of industry if the trade costs are sufficiently small. In the model
of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), that we extend, full agglomeration of industry occurs
if: 2φ
1− μm
σm−1
m > φ
2
m(1 + μmσm ) + 1 −
μm
σm
. Of course, we also obtain this expression
when μs = 0 (absence of a service sector). The incorporation of a service sector that
is mobile across regions preserves this property of the model, since there is a mutual
attraction between the two sectors, which is an additional incentive for industrial firms
and workers to remain at the core.
To understand this mutual attraction, observe that the agglomeration forces at
work are urbanization economies: workers in both sectors enjoy the availability of
greater varieties of services and of locally produced industrial goods (“cost-of-living”
effect); and firms enjoy having a greater local market (“home-market” effect), which is
constituted by all types of workers. On the other hand, the dispersion force (“market-
crowding” effect) only generates localization diseconomies because there is no com-
petition between industrial and service sector firms, neither in the product markets nor
in the labor markets.
In the literature (Helpman 1998; Südekum 2006; Pflüger and Südekum 2008), ser-
vices typically act as a dispersion force because the service sector is assumed to be
fixed (housing). An increase in the industrial activity leads to an increase in the price of
housing. This mitigates the tendency for agglomeration. Here, under the assumption
that the service sector is mobile across regions, we arrive at the opposite conclusion.
In our model, the service sector is mobile across regions and, therefore, either
becomes fully agglomerated together with the industrial sector (if and only if the
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“black-hole” condition holds) or partially agglomerated in the region where there is
more industry.
Lemma 4 The following configurations are never an equilibrium:
(i) agglomeration of each sector in different regions;
(ii) symmetric dispersion of services and agglomeration of industry;
(iii) agglomeration of services together with dispersion of industry.
The configurations (i) and (iii) are never an equilibrium because no industrial worker
is willing to remain in a region without services. Configuration (ii) cannot be an equi-
librium because the service sector workers would be attracted by the region in which
industry is agglomerated.
3.3 Symmetric dispersion of industry and services
It is also possible to have a symmetric dispersion of economic activity, as in the clas-
sical model when the trade costs are high.
Symmetric dispersion of the industrial and service activity, ( f ∗s , f ∗m) = (0.5, 0.5),
is an equilibrium if: the real wages are the same in both regions (ωs1 = ωs2 and
ωm1 = ωm2); and if a small migration of both kinds of workers generates a difference
between real wages that induces the workers to return to their original locations.
This last condition is verified if and only if, at ( f ∗s , f ∗m) = (0.5, 0.5), we have
det (J ) > 0 and tr(J ) < 0, where J is the Jacobian matrix obtained from expressions
(41) and (43):
J =
[
∂(ωm1−ωm2)
∂ fm
∂(ωm1−ωm2)
∂ fs
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂ fm
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂ fs
]
.
By symmetry, at ( f ∗s , f ∗m) = (0.5, 0.5), we have ωs1 = ωs2 and ωm1 = ωm2. The
only question is whether this spatial configuration is stable.
We know, from Lemma 2, that a migration of service sector workers generates
incentives for their return, i.e., ∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂ fs < 0. This contributes to the stability of
symmetric dispersion.
On the other hand, a migration of service sector workers generates incentives for
the industrial sector workers to follow them, because of the resulting wider supply of
services.
Lemma 5 When ( fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5), the migration of service sector workers to
region 1 increases the difference between the real wages of the industrial sector work-
ers in region 1 and region 2, that is, ∂(ωm1−ωm2)
∂ fs > 0.
The converse is also true, for the same economic reason. A migration of industrial
workers generates incentives for the service sector workers to follow them.
Lemma 6 When ( fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5), the migration of industrial sector workers to
region 1 increases the difference between the real wages of the service sector workers
in region 1 and region 2, that is, ∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂ fm > 0.
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Fig. 6 Dispersion of industry
Stability depends on the relative strength of the four effects that define the Jaco-
bian matrix. The following figures are useful for an intuitive understanding of the
dynamics.17
Assume that the economy is initially located in point A, with ( fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5).
We have ωm1 = ωm2 (Fig. 6) and ωs1 = ωs2 (Fig. 7). Consider an increase in the
number of industrial workers in region 1, to fm = 0.8 (point B). From Lemma 6, an
increase in fm increases ωs1 −ωs2, and thus the curve in Fig. 7 moves up. The service
sector workers would tend to move to region 1, until fs = 0.56. On the other hand,
with fs = 0.56, the curve in Fig. 6 moves up, and the industrial workers would also
migrate, until fm = 0.52. With fm = 0.52, the resulting fs would be lower than 0.56,
giving rise to a new fm , lower than 0.52. It seems that this process continues until
( fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5), suggesting that symmetric dispersion is an equilibrium.
We can see from Fig. 8 that dispersion is unstable when τm = 0.9.18 An increase
in fm increases the difference between the real wages of the industrial workers in
region 1 and region 2, attracting workers from region 2 to region 1. From Lemma 6,
an increase in fm also increases the difference between the real wages in the service
sector. Therefore, in the long run, we will have partial agglomeration of the service
sector activity and full agglomeration of the industrial activity.
17 To plot Figs. 6 and 7, we have set μm = 0.4, σm = 4, μs = 0.4, σs = 4 and τm = 0.5.
18 To plot Figs. 8 and 9, we have set μm = 0.4 σm = 4, μs = 0.4, σs = 4 and τm = 0.9. Additionally,
we have set fs = 0.5 to plot Fig. 8 and fm = 1 to plot Fig. 9.
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Fig. 7 Dispersion of services
Fig. 8 Dispersion becomes unstable
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Fig. 9 Asymmetric Dispersion
Figure 10 illustrates a case in which symmetric dispersion of the industrial and
service activity is an equilibrium for low values of φm .19
For the parameter values in our numerical example, tr(J ) is negative for any φm ∈
(0, 1). Therefore, the sign of the determinant is crucial for the stability. From Fig. 10,
we can see that det (J ) is positive for low values of φm . This means that the eigenvalues
of J have negative real parts, and symmetric dispersion of industry and services is an
equilibrium.
For high values of φm , the symmetric dispersion becomes unstable. In this case,
partial agglomeration of the service activity with full agglomeration of the industrial
activity in one region becomes the equilibrium.
This result can be viewed in Fig. 11, where we also plot the condition associated
with the full agglomeration of industry and partial agglomeration of services (46) as
a function of φm . When φm is higher than φ∗m , full agglomeration of all industrial
activity in one region with partial agglomeration of the service activity becomes an
equilibrium. Therefore, point A is a threshold value for φm .
In particular, when σs > μs + 1, the economy can have two distinct equilibrium
configurations. For high trade costs (low φm), we find that symmetric dispersion of
services and industry is an equilibrium, while for low trade costs (high φm ), we find that
full agglomeration of industry with partial agglomeration of services is an equilibrium.
The point is whether small deviations from symmetric dispersion tend to dissi-
pate or to reinforce themselves. Starting from a situation of symmetric dispersion, a
small migration of industrial workers is reinforced by the “home-market effect” and
19 In Figs. 10 and 11, it is also assumed that σm = 4, σs = 4, μm = 0.4 and μs = 0.4.
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Fig. 10 Det (J ) as a function of φm
Fig. 11 Threshold value for φm
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Fig. 12 Industry becomes dispersed
the “cost-of-living” effect. These two effects are strengthened by the fact that there
are some service sector workers that follow the industrial sector workers. Symmetric
dispersion is an equilibrium if the “market-crowding” effect in the industrial sector is
sufficiently strong to overcome these agglomeration forces.
3.4 The case in which services are tradable
In this section, we show, numerically, that a different spatial configuration of economic
activity, agglomeration of services with dispersion of industry, can appear when ser-
vices are tradable (0 < φs ≤ φm < 1).
Consider an initial equilibrium, in which both industry and services are concen-
trated in region 1. Figure 12 illustrates how a decrease in the trade cost of services
(an increase in τs) affects the spatial distribution of industry when all services are
concentrated in region 1 (point A). The main result is that a fall in the trade cost of
services leads to an equilibrium in which industry becomes asymmetrically dispersed
(point C), while the service sector remains concentrated in region 1 (see Fig. 13).20
The same decrease in the trade cost of services (from τs → 0 to τs = 0.4) may not
change the initial equilibrium configuration, being compatible with symmetric disper-
sion of both sectors (set τm = 0.5, keeping fixed the remaining parameters) or partial
agglomeration of services with full agglomeration of industry (set τm = 0.825).
20 To plot Figs. 12 and 13, we have set τm = 0.5, μm = 0.4, σm = 4, μs = 0.4, σs = 1.3. We also set
fs = 1 in Fig. 12 and fm = 1 in Fig. 13.
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Fig. 13 Agglomeration of services
4 Conclusion
We have extended the footloose entrepreneur model (Forslid and Ottaviano 2003)
to allow for a third sector: a monopolistic competitive sector of non-tradable goods
(services).
We find that the strength of the preference for variety of services is crucial to explain
the spatial distribution of the industrial and service activities. When the elasticity of
substitution among services is below a certain threshold, full agglomeration of indus-
try and services in a single region is always an equilibrium. But, this threshold value
for the elasticity of substitution among services seems a bit too low to be attainable
in modern economies, as it corresponds to a very high price markup over marginal
cost.21 Based on this model, we should not expect, therefore, full agglomeration of
industry and services in a single region.
With a higher elasticity of substitution among services, which is more likely, the
spatial distribution of economic activity depends on the trade costs in the industrial
sector. If these trade costs are high, symmetric dispersion of the services and industrial
activity is an equilibrium. If they are low, full agglomeration of industry with partial
agglomeration of services in the same region is an equilibrium (the industrialized
region has more than 50% of the service sector activity).
21 With services representing 50% of the economic activity (μs = 0.5), at this threshold (σs = 1 + μs ),
we obtain ps = σsσs−1 β = 3β (the price of a representative service is equal to 3 times the marginal cost).
A lower price markup is obtained if we consider a higher elasticity of substitution among services.
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The critical value of the trade costs above which agglomeration does not take place
should be higher in the presence of a non-tradable goods sector. This is because the
partial agglomeration of services in the core is an additional force that is contrary to
the dispersion of economic activity.
It is clear that an increase in the size of the service sector reduces the regional price
indices, thus increasing the welfare of the region. This, however, is a crude statement
about policy implications and welfare concerns. A deeper understanding is out of the
scope of this paper but is a relevant issue for future research.
Taking into account the existence of non-tradable goods, with specialized workers
that are mobile across regions, should provide new insights into the determinants of
the spatial organization of economic activity. We hope that this model may be seen as
a step in this direction.
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Appendix
Short-run equilibrium
The nominal wages of the industrial and service sector workers are:
Wmi = μm
σm
(
Yi
Mi + φm M j +
Y jφm
φm Mi + M j
)
, (24)
Wsi = μs
σs
(
Yi
Si + φs S j +
Y jφs
φs Si + S j
)
. (25)
The regional nominal incomes are:
Yi = 1 − M − S2 + Wmi Mi + Wsi Si . (26)
Our goal in this section is to find Wmi and Wsi as functions of the parameters of the
model. First, we determine Yi and Y j . Then, we substitute these into Wmi and Wsi .
Substituting (24) and (25) in (26) and using a = 1−M−S2 , we obtain:
Yi = a + Mi μm
σm
(
Yi
Mi + φm M j +
Y jφm
φm Mi + M j
)
+Si μs
σs
(
Yi
Si + φs S j +
Y jφs
φs Si + S j
)
.
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Rearranging, we obtain Yi as a function of Y j :
Yi
[
1 − μm Mi
σm
(
Mi + φm M j
) − μs Si
σs
(
Si + φs S j
)
]
= a +
[
μm Miφm
σm
(
φm Mi + M j
) + μs Siφs
σs
(
φs Si + S j
)
]
Y j .
For convenience, define:
bm = φm Mi + M j ,
cm = Mi + φm M j ,
bs = φs Si + S j ,
cs = Si + φs S j .
With some manipulation, we obtain:
Yi
σmcmσscs − μm Miσscs − μs Siσmcm
σmcmσscs
= a + μm Miφmσsbs + μs Siφsσmbm
σsbsσmbm
Y j .
Which is equivalent to:
Yi = aσmσscmcs + (μm Miφmσsbs + Siμsφsσmbm) cmcsb
−1
m b−1s Y j
σmcm (σscs − Siμs) − Miμmσscs . (27)
The above equation yields Yi as a function of Y j . By symmetry, we can write Y j as
function of Yi as follows:
Y j = aσmσsbmbs +
(
μm M jφmσscs + S jμsφsσmcm
)
bmbsc−1m c−1s Yi
σmbm
(
σsbs − S jμs
) − M jμmσsbs . (28)
Substituting (28) in (27) and simplifying, we obtain:
Yi = cmcs
[
σmbm
(
σsbs − S jμs
) − M jμmσsbs + Miμmφmσsbs + Siμsφsσmbm]
a−1σ−1m σ−1s R
,
(29)
and, by symmetry,
Y j = bmbs
[
σmcm (σscs − Siμs) − Miμmσscs + M jμmφmσscs + S jμsφsσmcm
]
a−1σ−1m σ−1s R
,
(30)
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where
R = [σmcm (σscs − Siμs) − Miμmσscs]
[
σmbm
(
σsbs − S jμs
) − M jμmσsbs]
− (Miμmφmσsbs + Siμsφsσmbm)
(
M jμmφmσscs + S jμsφsσmcm
)
.
Denoting by Y Ni and Y
N
j the numerators of Yi and Y j in Eqs. (29) and (30), we can
rewrite (24) in the following way:
Wmi = μmσsa
cmbm R
(
Y Ni bm + φmY Nj cm
)
.
Replacing the expressions for Yi and Y j , and setting i = 1 and j = 2, we obtain:
Wm1 = μmaσmσsR
[
csbm (σsbs − S2μs) − M2csσ−1m μmσsbs + M1csσ−1m μmφmσsbs
+S1μsφscsbm + φmbscm (σscs − S1μs) − M1φmbsμmσsσ−1m cs
+M2φ2mbsμmσsσ−1m cs + S2φmbsμsφscm
]
.
Denoting C = μm cs bsσsaR , and replacing bm, cm, bs , and cs by the corresponding
expressions:
Wm1
C
= σm (φm M1 + M2)
(
σs − μs S2 − φs S1S2 + φs S1
)
+ μmσs (φm M1 − M2)
+φm
[
σm (M1 + φm M2)
(
σs − μs S1 − φs S2S1 + φs S2
)
+ μmσs(φm M2 − M1)
]
.
Manipulating:
Wm1
C
= φmσm M1
[
2σs − μs
(
S2 − φs S1
S2 + φs S1 +
S1 − φs S2
S1 + φs S2
)]
+M2
[
σmσs
(
φ2m + 1
)
+ σsμm
(
φ2m − 1
)
− σmμs
(
φ2m
S1 − φs S2
S1 + φs S2 +
S2 − φs S1
S2 + φs S1
)]
.
It is easy to show that:
S2 − φs S1
φs S1 + S2 +
S1 − φs S2
S1 + φs S2 =
2S1S2
(
1 − φ2s
)
S1S2
(
1 + φ2s
) + φs (S21 + S22) .
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Substituting this expression, we determine Wm1 and (by symmetry) Wm2. The nom-
inal wages in the service sector are also obtained, by analogy:
Wm1 = Cσm2φm M1
⎡
⎣σs − μs S1S2
(
1 − φ2s
)
S1S2
(
1 + φ2s
)
+ φs
(
S21 + S22
)
⎤
⎦
+Cσm M2
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
μm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− μs
(
φ2m
S1 − φs S2
S1 + φs S2 +
S2 − φs S1
φs S1 + S2
)}
, (31)
Wm2 = Cσm2φm M2
⎡
⎣σs − μs S1S2
(
1 − φ2s
)
S1S2
(
1 + φ2s
)
+ φs
(
S21 + S22
)
⎤
⎦
+Cσm M1
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
μm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− μs
(
φ2m
S2 − φs S1
φs S1 + S2 +
S1 − φs S2
S1 + φs S2
)}
, (32)
Ws1 = Dσs2φs S1
⎡
⎣σm − μm M1 M2
(
1 − φ2m
)
M1 M2
(
1 + φ2m
)
+ φm
(
M21 + M22
)
⎤
⎦
+Dσs S2
{
σm
[
φ2s + 1 +
μs
σs
(φ2s − 1)
]
− μm
(
φ2s
M1 − φm M2
M1 + φm M2 +
M2 − φm M1
φm M1 + M2
)}
, (33)
Ws2 = Dσs2φs S2
⎡
⎣σm − μm M1 M2
(
1 − φ2m
)
M1 M2
(
1 + φ2m
)
+ φm
(
M21 + M22
)
⎤
⎦
+Dσs S1
{
σm
[
φ2s + 1 +
μs
σs
(φ2s − 1)
]
− μm
(
φ2s
M2 − M1φm
φm M1 + M2 +
M1 − φm M2
M1 + φm M2
)}
, (34)
where
C = μmσs
1−M−S
2 (S1 + φs S2)(φs S1 + S2)
R
,
D = μsσm
1−M−S
2 (M1 + φm M2)(φm M1 + M2)
R
,
and
R = {σm (M1 + φm M2) [σs (S1 + φs S2) − S1μs] − M1μmσs (S1 + φs S2)}
× {σm (φm M1 + M2) [σs (φs S1 + S2) − S2μs] − M2μmσs (φs S1 + S2)}
− [M1μmφmσs (φs S1 + S2) + S1μsφsσm (φm M1 + M2)]
× [M2μmφmσs (S1 + φs S2) + S2μsφsσm (M1 + φm M2)] .
Short-run equilibrium with τs → 0
With τs → 0, Eqs. (1), (18), (21)–(23) become:
Wm1 = μm
σm M
[
Y1
fm + φm(1 − fm) +
φmY2
φm fm + 1 − fm
]
,
Wm2 = μm
σm M
[
Y2
1 − fm + φm fm +
φmY1
φm(1 − fm) + fm
]
,
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Ws1 = μsY1
σs S fs ,
Ws2 = μsY2
σs S(1 − fs) ,
Y1 = 1 − M − S2 + Wm1 M fm + Ws1S fs,
Y2 = 1 − M − S2 + Wm2 M(1 − fm) + Ws2S(1 − fs),
P1 = ρ [ fm + (1 − fm)φm]
μm
1−σm f
μs
1−σs
s ,
P2 = ρ [φm fm + (1 − fm)]
μm
1−σm (1 − fs)
μs
1−σs .
From (31)–(34), we compute the nominal wages of the workers in each region:
Wm1
C0σm
= 2φm M1 (σs − μs) + M2
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
μm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− μs
(
1 + φ2m
)}
, (35)
Wm2
C0σm
= 2φm M2 (σs − μs) + M1
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
μm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− μs
(
1 + φ2m
)}
, (36)
Ws1
D0σs
= S2
[
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
− μm M2 − φm M1
φm M1 + M2
]
, (37)
Ws2
D0σs
= S1
[
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
− μm M1 − φm M2M1 + φm M2
]
, (38)
where
C0 = μm S1S2R0σm ,
D0 = μs(M1 + φm M2)(φm M1 + M2)R0σs ,
and
R0 = S1S2
aσmσs
{
[σm (M1 + φm M2) (σs − μs) − M1μmσs]
× [σm (φm M1 + M2) (σs − μs) − M2μmσs] − M1 M2μ2mφ2mσ 2s
}
.
Dividing the nominal wage in the industrial sector (35) by the regional price level,
we obtain the real wages of the industrial workers:
ωm1 =
2φm fm (σs − μs) + (1 − fm)
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 + μmσm (φ2m − 1)
]
− μs
(
1 + φ2m
)}
Rm [ fm + (1 − fm)φm ]
μm
1−σm f
μs
1−σs
s
(39)
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and
ωm2 =
2φm(1 − fm) (σs − μs) + fm
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 + μmσm (φ2m − 1)
]
− μs
(
1 + φ2m
)}
Rm [φm fm + (1 − fm)]
μm
1−σm (1 − fs)
μs
1−σs
,
(40)
where
Rm = ρM
aμmσmσs
{
{σm [ fm + φm(1 − fm)] (σs − μs) − fmμmσs}
× {σm [φm fm + (1 − fm)] (σs − μs) − (1 − fm)μmσs} − fm(1 − fm)μ2mφ2mσ 2s
}
.
With some manipulation, we find that the real wage differential in the industrial
sector can be written as:
ωm1 − ωm2 = μm K
φm
[ f 2m + (1 − fm)2] K1 + (1 − fm) fm K2 × (ω¯m1 − ω¯m2) ,
(41)
where
K = σ
1−μm
m σ
1−μs
s (1 − M − S) (σm − 1)μm (σs − 1)μs
2α
μm
σm−1
m α
μs
σs−1
s β
μm+μs M1−
μm
σm−1 S−
μs
σs−1
,
K1 = σm (σs − μs) [σm (σs − μs) − σsμm ] ,
K2 = σm (σs − μs)
[
σm (σs − μs)
(
1 + φ2m
)
− 2μmσs
]
+ μ2mσ 2s
(
1 − φ2m
)
,
ω¯m1 =
2φm fm (σs − μs) + (1 − fm)
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 + μmσm (φ2m − 1)
]
− μs
(
φ2m + 1
)}
[ fm + (1 − fm)φm ]
μm
1−σm f
μs
1−σs
s
,
ω¯m2 =
2φm(1 − fm) (σs − μs) + fm
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 + μmσm (φ2m − 1)
]
− μs
(
φ2m + 1
)}
[φm fm + (1 − fm)]
μm
1−σm (1 − fs)
μs
1−σs
.
Similarly, for the service sector, we obtain:
ωs1 =
[ fm + φm(1 − fm)] [φm fm + 1 − fm]
[
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
− μm 1− fm−φm fm1− fm+φm fm
]
Rs [ fm + (1 − fm)φm]
μm
1−σm f 1−
μs
σs−1
s
(42)
and
ωs2 =
[ fm + φm(1 − fm)] [φm fm + 1 − fm]
[
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
− μm fm−φm (1− fm )fm+φm (1− fm )
]
Rs [φm fm + (1 − fm)]
μm
1−σm (1 − fs)1−
μs
σs−1
,
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where
Rs = ρS
aσmσs
{
[σm [ fm + φm(1 − fm)] (σs − μs) − fmμmσs ]
× [σm (φm fm + 1 − fm) (σs − μs) − (1 − fm)μmσs ] − fm(1 − fm)μ2mφ2mσ 2s
}
.
Again, after some manipulation, we write the real wage differential in the service
sector as:
ωs1 − ωs2 = μs K
{
φm
[ f 2m + (1 − fm)2] + fm (1 − fm) (1 + φ2m)}
φm
[ f 2m + (1 − fm)2] K1 + (1 − fm) fm K2 (ω¯s1 − ω¯s2)
(43)
where
ω¯s1 =
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
− μm 1− fm (1+φm )1− fm (1−φm )
[ fm + (1 − fm)φm]
μm
1−σm f 1−
μs
σs−1
s
;
ω¯s2 =
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
− μm fm (1+φm )−φmfm (1−φm )+φm
[φm fm + (1 − fm)]
μm
1−σm (1 − fs)1−
μs
σs−1
.
Long-run equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 1 Since regions are symmetric, we only study agglomeration in
region 1.
When the workers become concentrated in region 1, Rm converges to:
lim
fm→1−
Rm = ρMφm
aμmσs
(σmσs − μsσm − μmσs) (σs − μs) > 0.
Therefore, we have
lim
( fm , fs )→(1−,1−)
ωm1 = 2φm (σs − μs)lim( fm , fs )→(1−,1−) Rm
= 2aμmσs
ρM (σmσs − σmμs − μmσs) .
While
lim
( fm , fs )→(1−,1−)
ωm2 =
σs
[
φ2m + 1 + μmσm (φ2m − 1)
]
− μs
(
1 + φ2m
)
lim( fm , fs )→(1−,1−) Rmφ
μm
1−σm
m (1 − fs)
μs
1−σs
.
The numerator is positive, while the denominator goes to infinity. Thus,
lim
( fm , fs )→(1−,1−)
ωm2 = 0.
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We conclude that the industrial workers remain concentrated, as:
lim
( fm , fs )→(1−,1−)
ωm1 > lim
( fm , fs )→(1−,1−)
ωm2.
In the service sector, direct substitution of fm = fs = 1 in (42) leads to:
lim
( fm , fs )→(1−,1−)
ωs1 =
φm
[
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
+ μm
]
lim( fm , fs )→(1−,1−) Rs
.
Substituting fm = fs = 1 in the expression for Rs , we obtain the following:
lim
( fm , fs )→(1−,1−)
Rs = ρS
aσs
φm (σmσs − σmμs − μmσs) (σs − μs) .
Hence,
lim
( fm , fs )→(1−,1−)
ωs1 =
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
+ μm
ρS
aσs
(σmσs − σmμs − μmσs) (σs − μs)
> 0.
While
lim
( fm , fs )→(1−,1−)
ωs2 =
φ
1−σm−μm
1−σm
m
[
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
− μm
]
lim( fm , fs )→(1−,1−) Rs(1 − fs)1−
μs
σs−1
=
φ
μm
σm−1
m
[
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
− μm
]
ρS
aσs
(σmσs − σmμs − μmσs) (σs − μs)
lim
( fm , fs )→(1−,1−)
(1 − fs)
σs−1−μs
1−σs .
The real wage of the service workers in the empty region tends to zero if σs < 1 +μs
and to plus infinity if σs > 1 + μs . Notice also that with σs = 1 + μs , we have
ωs1 > ωs2 (in the limit).
We conclude that agglomeration of both sectors in a single region is an equilibrium
if and only if μs ≥ σs − 1. 
unionsq
Proof of Lemma 2 From Eq. (42), in region 1, the real wage in the service sector, ws1,
is proportional to f
μs
σs−1 −1
s . When μs < σs − 1, it is decreasing with fs , tending to
+∞ as fs decreases to 0.
By symmetry, in region 2, the real wage in the service sector, ws2, is increasing
with fs (decreasing with 1− fs), tending to +∞ as fs increases to 1 (1− fs decreases
to 0).
Therefore, an increase in fs decreases the difference between ws1 and ws2. As the
share of services increases from 0 to 1, ws1 − ws2 decreases from +∞ to −∞. 
unionsq
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Proof of Lemma 3 Since regions are symmetric, we only study the case in which all
the industrial activity is concentrated in region 1.
When fm = 1, the difference between the real wages of the service sector
workers is:
ωs1 − ωs2 = μs KK1
⎡
⎣σm(1 − μsσs ) + μm
f 1−
μs
σs−1
s
− σm(1 −
μs
σs
) − μm
φ
μm
1−σm
m (1 − fs)1−
μs
σs−1
⎤
⎦ .
We begin our proof by calculating the values of fs ∈ (0, 1) for which ωs1 − ωs2 = 0.
Since K and K1 are strictly positive and finite:
0 = σm(1 −
μs
σs
) + μm
f 1−
μs
σs−1
s
− σm(1 −
μs
σs
) − μm
φ
μm
1−σm
m (1 − fs)1−
μs
σs−1
⇔ 1 − fsfs =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
σm(1 − μsσs ) − μm
φ
μm
1−σm
m
[
σm(1 − μsσs ) + μm
]
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
σs−1
σs−1−μs
. (44)
Simplifying:
fs = 1⎧⎨
⎩ σm (1−
μs
σs
)−μm
φ
μm
1−σm
m
[
σm (1−μsσs )+μm
]
⎫⎬
⎭
σs−1
σs−1−μs
+ 1
. (45)
Notice that since φ
μm
1−σm
m > 1, we have
0 <
σm(1 − μsσs ) − μm
φ
μm
1−σm
m
[
σm(1 − μsσs ) + μm
] < 1.
Therefore, since σs > μs + 1, we have
0 <
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
σm(1 − μsσs ) − μm
φ
μm
1−σm
m
[
σm(1 − μsσs ) + μm
]
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
σs−1
σs−1−μs
< 1
and
1
2
< fs < 1.
It remains to verify the equilibrium condition for the industrial sector.
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When the industrial workers are concentrated in region 1, the difference between
the real wages in the two regions is:
ωm1 − ωm2 = μm K
φm K1
⎧⎨
⎩2φm(σs − μs)f μs1−σss
−
σs
[
φ2m + 1 + μmσm (φ2m − 1)
]
− μs(φ2m + 1)
φ
μm
1−σm
m (1 − fs)
μs
1−σs
⎫⎬
⎭ .
Then, ωm1 − ωm2 > 0 if and only if:
2φm(σs − μs)
f
μs
1−σs
s
>
σs
[
φ2m + 1 + μmσm (φ2m − 1)
]
− μs(φ2m + 1)
φ
μm
1−σm
m (1 − fs)
μs
1−σs
⇔
(
1 − fs
fs
) μs
1−σs
>
σs
[
φ2m + 1 + μmσm (φ2m − 1)
]
− μs(φ2m + 1)
2φm(σs − μs)φ
μm
1−σm
m
Replacing Eq. (44), we obtain the following:
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
σm(1 − μsσs ) − μm
φ
μm
1−σm
m
[
σm(1 − μsσs ) + μm
]
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
−μs
σs−1−μs
>
σs
[
φ2m + 1 + μmσm (φ2m − 1)
]
− μs(φ2m + 1)
2(σs − μs)φ
μm
1−σm +1
m
.
Rearranging:
[
σm(1 − μsσs ) − μm
σm(1 − μsσs ) + μm
] −μs
σs−1−μs
φ
1− μm (σs−1)
(σm−1)(σs−1−μs )
m
−
φ2m
[
σs(1 + μmσm ) − μs
]
+ σs(1 − μmσm ) − μs
2(σs − μs) > 0.
Agglomeration of all the industrial activity in a region and partial agglomeration
dispersion of the service activity are a steady state when the above condition is satisfied.
Lemma 2 provides the stability condition, guaranteeing that it is an equilibrium. 
unionsq
Proof of Lemma 4 (i) Since regions are symmetric, we only need to study the case
in which industry is concentrated in region 1 and services are concentrated in
region 2. We look at points near ( fm, fs) = (1, 0) and at what happens when
first fm → 1 and then fs → 0.
The difference between the real wages in the industrial sector when all the
industry is located in region 1 and all the services are located in region 2 is,
using (41):
ωm1 − ωm2 = μm K
φm K1
(ω¯m1 − ω¯m2).
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Notice that the constants K and K1 are strictly positive and finite.
Observe also that when ( fm, fs) = (1, 0), we have ω¯m1 = 0 and ω¯m2 > 0.
Therefore, ωm1 < ωm2.
Agglomeration of each sector in a different region is never an equilibrium.
(ii) Since regions are symmetric, it is enough to study the case in which services
are symmetrically dispersed while the industry is concentrated in region 1.
The difference between the real wages in the service sector when fs = 0.5 and
fm = 1 is:
ωs1 − ωs2 = μs KK1 (ω¯s1 − ω¯s2) .
The constants K and K1 are strictly positive and finite.
With ( fs, fm) = ( 12 , 1), we have:
ω¯s2 =
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
− μm
φ
μm
1−σm
m
1
2
σs−1−μs
σs−1
and ω¯s1 =
σs
(
1 − μs
σs
)
+ μm( 1
2
) σs−1−μs
σs−1
.
Therefore, ω¯s2 < ω¯s1 is equivalent to:
(
1 − φ
μm
1−σm
m
)
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
< μm
(
φ
μm
1−σm
m + 1
)
,
which is true because the right-hand side of this inequality is positive, whereas
the left-hand side is negative. Therefore, ωs2 < ωs1.
Symmetric dispersion of services with agglomeration of industry cannot be an
equilibrium.
(iii) Since regions are symmetric, it is enough to study the case in which industry
is dispersed while services are concentrated in region 2 ( fs = 0).
From expression (41), the difference between the real wages in the industrial
sector is:
ωm1 − ωm2 = μm K
φm
[ f 2m + (1 − fm)2] K1 + (1 − fm) fm K2 (ω¯m1 − ω¯m2) .
With fs = 0, we have ω¯m1 = 0 and ω¯m2 > 0.
This implies that ωm1 < ωm2, because K , K1 and K2 are strictly positive and
finite.
Dispersion of industry with agglomeration of services cannot be an
equilibrium. 
unionsq
Proof of Lemma 5 We want to prove that ∂(ωm1−ωm2)
∂ fs > 0.
From (41), we know that the sign of ∂(ω¯m1−ω¯m2)
∂ fs is the same.
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Calculating the partial derivatives:
∂ω¯m1
∂ fs =
2φm fm (σs − μs) + (1 − fm)
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 + μmσm (φ2m − 1)
]
− μs
(
φ2m + 1
)}
σs−1
μs
[ fm + (1 − fm)φm ]
μm
1−σm f 1−
μs
σs−1
s
,
∂ω¯m2
∂ fs = −
2φm(1 − fm) (σs − μs) + fm
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 + μmσm (φ2m − 1)
]
− μs
(
φ2m + 1
)}
σs−1
μs
[φm fm + (1 − fm)]
μm
1−σm (1 − fs)1−
μs
σs−1
.
Substituting ( fs, fm) = ( 12 , 12 ), we find that:
∂ (ω¯m1 − ω¯m2)
∂ fs =
2φm (σs − μs) +
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 + μmσm
(
φ2m − 1
)]
− μs
(
φ2m + 1
)}
σs−1
μs
[
1
2 (1 + φm)
] μm
1−σm
(
1
2
)1− μs
σs−1
> 0.

unionsq
Proof of Lemma 6 We want to prove that ∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂ fm > 0. Using Eq. (43), we deter-
mine the partial derivative:
∂(ωs1 − ωs2)
∂ fm =
∂
∂ fm
[
μs K
{
φm
[ f 2m + (1 − fm)2] + fm (1 − fm) (1 + φ2m)}
φm
[ f 2m + (1 − fm)2] K1 + (1 − fm) fm K2
]
(ω¯s1 − ω¯s2)
+ ∂ (ω¯s1 − ω¯s2)
∂ fm
[
μs K
{
φm
[ f 2m + (1 − fm)2] + fm (1 − fm) (1 + φ2m)}
φm
[ f 2m + (1 − fm)2] K1 + (1 − fm) fm K2
]
.
Since we are evaluating the derivative at ( fs, fm) =
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
, the first term
disappears:
∂(ωs1 − ωs2)
∂ fm =
∂ (ω¯s1 − ω¯s2)
∂ fm
[
μs K
(
2φm + 1 + φ2m
)
2φm K1 + K2
]
.
The partial derivative of ω¯s1 with respect to fm is:
∂ω¯s1
∂ fm =
1
[ fm + (1 − fm)φm]
μm
1−σm f 1−
μs
σs−1
s
×μm (1 + φm) [1 − fm(1 − φm)] + (φm − 1) [1 − fm(1 + φm)][1 − fm(1 − φm)]2
+ 1{
[ fm + (1 − fm)φm]
μm
1−σm f 1−
μs
σs−1
s
}2
× μm
σm − 1 [ fm + (1 − fm)φm]
μm
1−σm −1 f 1−
μs
σs−1
s (1 − φm)
×
[
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
− μm 1 − fm (1 + φm)1 − fm (1 − φm)
]
.
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Substituting ( fs, fm) = ( 12 , 12 ):
∂ω¯s1
∂ fm
∣∣∣∣
( fs , fm )=
(
1
2 ,
1
2
) = μm
[
(1 + φm)
( 1
2 + 12φm
) + (φm − 1) ( 12 − 12φm)]( 1
2 + 12φm
) μm
1−σm 2−1+
μs
σs−1
( 1
2 + 12φm
)2
+
μm
σm−1
( 1
2 + 12φm
) μm
1−σm −1 2−1+
μs
σs−1 (1 − φm)[( 1
2 + 12φm
) μm
1−σm 2−1+
μs
σs−1
]2
[
σm
(
1 − μs
σs
)
− μm
1
2 − 12φm
1
2 + 12φm
]
.
Both terms are positive; therefore, ∂ωs1
∂ fm > 0.
By symmetry, ∂ωs2
∂ fm = − ∂ωs1∂ fm . Hence, we conclude that ∂(ωs1−ωs2)∂ fm
∣∣∣ fm= fs= 12 is
positive. 
unionsq
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